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INTRODUCTION

Judges on a multimember court might vote in two different ways. In the first,
judges behave solipsistically, imagining themselves to be the sole judge on the
court, in the style of Ronald Dworkin's mythical Judge Hercules. 1 On this
model, judges base their votes solely on the information contained in the legal
sources before them-statutes, regulations, precedents, and the like-and the
arguments of advocates. In the second model, judges vote interdependently;

* Kirkland & Ellis Distinguished Service Professor of Law, The University of Chicago Law School.
© 2016, Eric A. Posner. Thanks to the Russell Baker Scholars Fund for financial support.
** John H. Watson, Jr. Professor of Law, Harvard Law School. © 2016, Adrian Vermeule. Thanks to
Hillel Bavli, Daniel Hemel, Christian List, Jonathan Masur, Jennifer Nou, Ariel Porat, Cass Sunstein,
Asher Steinberg, Mark Tushnet, and Glen Weyl for helpful comments, and to Evelyn Blacklock for
outstanding research assistance.
1. See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 239 (1986).
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they take into account not only the legal sources and arguments, but also the
information contained in the votes of other judges, based on the same sources
and arguments. What does the law say about these two models? May judges
take into account the votes of colleagues in deciding how to vote themselves?
Should they do so? Are there even conditions under which judges must do so?
There is a further distinction: between cases in which the underlying legal
question is strictly a first-order question (is it per se negligence to text while
driving?) and cases that build in, right into the rule itself, a question about
whether the first-order question is or is not "clear." We will call these two
classes of questions simple questions and complex questions respectively. As to
complex questions, it can always be argued that the underlying legal rule itself
seems to make agreement or disagreement among the set of voters legally
consequential; after all, if reasonable judges disagree, can the question really be
clear?
Complex questions are ubiquitous in public law, although the category has
not been recognized as such, 2 perhaps because it is protean, taking different
forms in different settings. Consider these puzzles:
* The Supreme Court has taken a merits case that involves a challenge to
the legal validity of an agency rule under the Chevron test.3 Under Chevron, let us assume, the government wins so long as the agency
offers a "reasonable" interpretation of statutory meaning, even if it is not
clearly correct. 4 The challengers have to show that the agency's interpretation is clearly wrong, as a matter of the statute's ordinary meaning.
Suppose further that, to date, nine lower court judges have voted on the
merits of the case, and that six of those judges have voted in the
agency's favor (either on the ground that the agency's view is clearly
correct or on the ground that the agency's view is reasonable).5 Given

2. With the exception of a paragraph by Jon Elster:
If the minority of a jury finds that the accused has not been shown to be guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt, shouldn't the majority infer that he hasn't? If a minority on a court
disagrees with a majority's reading of the 'plain meaning' of a text, doesn't that ipso facto
show that the majority is wrong? Consider finally the question whether an emergency exists. 'In
principle, the existence of an emergency should be manifest. The fact of reasoned disagreement over
whether terrorism constitutes an emergency demonstrates that it is not one.'
Jon Elster, Unwritten Constitutional Norms 26 (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the authors)
(internal citations omitted) (citing Bernard Manin, Anti-Terrorist Policies and Emergency Powers
(2006) (unpublished manuscript)).
3. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
4. See id. at 842-43.
5. Roughly the situation in King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015), before the Supreme Court's
decision. The nine comprise the six appellate judges who voted on the merits in King and Halbig, the
two district judges in those cases, and one district judge in Oklahoma. See King v. Burwell, 759 F.3d
358, 375 (4th Cir. 2014); Halbig v. Burwell, 758 F.3d 390, 412 (D.C. Cir. 2014); Oklahoma ex rel.
Pruitt v. Burwell, 51 F. Supp. 3d 1080, 1093 (E.D. Okla. 2014); King v. Sebelius, 997 F. Supp. 2d 415,
432 (E.D. Va. 2014); Halbig v. Sebelius, 27 F. Supp. 3d 1, 25 (D.D.C. 2014).
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that six out of the nine judges to vote on the merits have ruled in favor
of the agency, isn't it difficult to say that the agency's view is clearly unreasonable? In light of these votes, to say that the statute has a clear
ordinary meaning contrary to the agency's interpretation verges on
self-refutation. It implies that the judges in the majority of six can't read
English. It is logically possible that the sample of judges is severely
biased in the government's favor, to be sure. But suppose that under the
relevant rules of jurisdiction and procedure the challengers have had
broad latitude to choose their playing field(s), and have been unable
even to muster a majority of judicial votes, let alone the supermajority
that would be necessary to suggest that the statute's ordinary meaning
clearly supports their case.
Relatedly: Sometimes courts deciding Chevron cases say that the question is whether the statute is or is not "ambiguous." Isn't disagreement
among Justices or judges relevant to that determination? On the Supreme Court, if five Justices say that the statute clearly means X and
four Justices say that it clearly means Y, isn't that at least some evidence
that the statute is ambiguous? What if one group says that the statute
clearly means X, and the other says that the statute is ambiguous?
In cases about qualified immunity, if some appellate courts say that a
certain rule counts as "clearly established law," and some say that it
doesn't, doesn't that mean it doesn't? What if the second group says not
merely that the rule isn't clearly established, but that the opposite rule is
clearly established? What if the disagreement is not across courts, but
within a multimember appellate court? When the Court decides 5-4 that
the police violated a right, does the vote itself tend to show that the right
was not clearly established?
Under the rule of lenity and the related constitutional principle of fair
notice, if some appellate courts interpret a criminal statute one way, and
some a different way, does that mean that the statute is ambiguous,
allowing the defendant to6 claim lack of notice or that the statute does not
clearly support liability?
A famous puzzle about juries, stemming from James Fitzjames Stephen,
is whether majority rule can coherently be combined with the reasonable
doubt rule.7 The argument that it cannot goes like this: Imagine that the
jury votes 7-5 to convict the defendant. Assuming the jurors are reasonable, doesn't the close vote itself suggest the existence of a reasonable
doubt?

6. Thanks to Will Baude for suggesting this example. See William Baude, Qualified Immunity and
the Supreme Court 25-26 (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the authors).
7. See 1 JAMES FITZJAMES STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 560 (London,
MacMillan & Co. 1883) [hereinafter STEPHEN, A HISTORY]; JAMES FITZJAMES STEPHEN, A GENERAL VIEW
OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 220-21 (London, MacMillan & Co. 1890) [hereinafter STEPHEN, A
GENERAL VIEw].
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The last example shows that the problem of interdependent voting on complex questions generalizes well beyond judges, of course. It arises whenever a
multimember decision-making body, or a hierarchy of such bodies, has to apply
a legal rule that itself refers to agreement, or to decide whether a legal standard
is or is not clearly satisfied, or whether "reasonable" disagreement exists. In all
these equivalent formulations, disagreement among the voters is itself informative about whether the legal standard is met.
To date, the law has no general theory about how to approach interdependent
voting. Each setting is taken on its own terms, and judges muddle through. The
problem is that some judges muddle in one direction, some in another, without
any consistent approach, either across judges, or across settings. Some judges
who are, for example, willing to take the votes of other judges as evidence that
the law is not clearly established for purposes of qualified immunity, are
seemingly unwilling to take the votes of other judges into account for purposes
of establishing that a statute is ambiguous, or that the rule of lenity should

apply.
We will offer a general theory of the class of problems, not just a theory of
particular examples. We argue for a presumption that judges not only may, but
should consider the votes of other judges as relevant evidence or information,
unless special circumstances make the systemic costs of doing so clearly greater
than the benefits. Our view is not absolutist; we do not say that judges should
always and everywhere consider the votes of other judges. Under certain
conditions, it may be better for decision makers not to attempt to consider all
available information, and we will attempt to indicate what those conditions
might be. But we will argue that such conditions should not casually be
assumed to exist. Interdependence should be the norm, and solipsism the
exception, so that unless judges have good reason to do otherwise, they should
take into account the information contained in other judges' votes.
Part I both delimits our topic and thesis and aims to offer a range of
examples, cases, and puzzles. Our central case is an extended fugue on Chevronrelated examples and variants, but we also consider qualified immunity, new
rules in habeas corpus, mandamus, and the rule of lenity. Having laid out the
problems, Part II attempts to answer them. We offer a theory of judicial
information-acquisition, under which judges should not throw away potentially
relevant information unless there are special reasons to be concerned that the
systemic costs of interdependence exceed the benefits.
I. CASES AND PUZZLES
A. A CHEVRON FUGUE

To delimit and motivate our topic, let us begin with the cleanest available
setting: voting within a multimember group of Justices at the Supreme Court.
We will use Chevron examples, implicitly motivated by a string of 5-4 Chevron
decisions that feature or will soon feature in the textbooks of administrative law

2016]

THE VOTES OF OTHER JUDGES

8
and legislation, such as FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corporation
and
9
Massachusetts v. EPA. Throughout, we will assume that Chevron has already
been determined to apply; we bracket and ignore, in other words, the problems
usually lumped together under the rubric of "Chevron Step Zero. ' We begin
with the most straightforward possible case and then consider variants and
extensions.
"Plain meaning" in opposite directions. Suppose that regulated parties challenge a final agency rule as unauthorized by the agency's organic statute.
Suppose also that under previous precedent, as all nine Justices agree, the
governing version of Chevron states as follows: if the statute is unambiguous,
then the agency must comply with it; if the statute is ambiguous, then any
reasonable interpretation by the agency will be upheld.11
So far so good, but a problem arises. At the conference after oral argument,
five Justices say that the ordinary meaning of the statute is clearly X, and four
say that it is clearly Y. Each camp is astonished to hear the other camp's view.
Each is astonished to hear that the other camp not only fails to realize that (X or
Y) is the clear meaning, but actually, and quite perversely, believes that instead
(Y or X) is not only one possible reading, but is actually the clear meaning.
We suggest that all nine Justices need a stiff dose of episteic humility.
Shouldn't all nine update their views and learn from the aggregate information
contained in the votes of colleagues? Shouldn't all nine entertain the possibility
that despite their confident certainty that the statute is clear, the vote actually
reveals the statute to be ambiguous? Certainly epistemic humility suggests that
the confidence of others, even others one thinks are wrong, should undermine
one's own confidence in being right.

8. 529 U.S. 120 (2000).
9. 549 U.S. 497 (2007).
10. See Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REv. 187, 191 (2006). For a recent "step
zero" case, see King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2488-89 (2015).
11. This is a stripped-down version of the original Chevron framework. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v.
Nat. Res. Def.Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984). Under the actual current law, a number of
recent decisions opt, more simply, for a one-step version of Chevron, under which the only question is
whether the agency's interpretation is "reasonable." See, e.g., Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, Inc., 556
U.S. 208, 218 (2009) ("[The agency's] view governs if it is a reasonable interpretation of the
statute-not necessarily the only possible interpretation, nor even the interpretation deemed most
reasonable by the courts."); id.at 218 n.4 ("The dissent finds it 'puzzling' that we invoke this
proposition (that a reasonable agency interpretation prevails) at the 'outset,' omitting the supposedly
prior inquiry of 'whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue.' But surely if
Congress has directly spoken to an issue then any agency interpretation contradicting what Congress
has said would be unreasonable." (internal citations omitted)); see also United States v. Home Concrete
& Supply, LLC, 132 S. Ct. 1836, 1847 (2012) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment); Esquivel-Quintana v. Lynch, 810 F.3d 1019, 1024 (6th Cir. 2016); United States v.
Garcia-Santana, 774 F.3d 528, 542 (9th Cir. 2014). One of us has argued that the original two-step
framework boils down to the same thing, so that its supersession in the more recent cases involves no
loss of content and some gain in clarity and transparency. See Matthew C. Stephenson & Adrian
Vermeule, Chevron Has Only One Step, 95 VA. L. REv. 597 (2009). For present purposes, however, all
the points we wish to make can be translated into either the two-step version or the one-step version.
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There are actually two distinct questions here. One is whether each individual
judge is permitted to incorporate the views of other judges; the other is whether
the judge is obliged to do so. If judges are obligated, then they are permitted,
but the converse does not hold. It is perfectly possible to say that judges may,

but need not, consider the votes of others. On this latter view, at a minimum, the
votes of other judges provide relevant and admissible information that any
given judge may use, even if she need not.
Our view of the first hypothetical is simple. Presumptively, absent further
special circumstances, the individual judge is not only permitted, but required to
consider the votes of others. Not to do so would be to throw away relevant
information for no gain. If other colleagues, who are presumptively reasonable,
agree that the statute is clear, but believe that it is clear in precisely the opposite
direction, it would be indefensible epistemic practice to simply ignore their
views. In Part II, we will flesh out the theoretical foundations of this claim and
examine a range of possible exceptions and override conditions in which the
systemic costs of considering such information outweigh the benefits. Here we
merely aim to clarify the basic structure of the problem and of our thesis.
Assuming for now that our view is correct, its immediate implication, in this
case, would be to suggest a two-step procedure for voting among the Justices.
After each Justice has disclosed her initial assessment of the statute's meaning,
a round of updating should occur, in which each Justice takes into account the
information contained in the other Justices' votes. In the case at hand, it is
possible-although not necessary-that each Justice will decide, in light of the
other Justices' votes, that the statute is simply ambiguous. If this occurs, the
agency will win 9-0, even if it would have lost 5-4 under a one-step voting
procedure.
To sum up, a common sight at the Court involves Chevron cases in which the
agency loses or wins by a 5-4 vote, with each camp claiming that the statute
clearly supports its view. Yet, when this scenario occurs, something has gone
wrong, at least presumptively. In this setting, the legal rule itself specifies
which party should win if reasonable disagreement is present: the agency should
win. Accordingly, if a straw vote among the Justices shows a 5-4 split, then all
the Justices should update their views, at least presumptively; they should
realize that the statute is ambiguous and that there is reasonable disagreement in
the case. Under any other approach, judges in effect throw away valuable
information-the information contained in their colleagues' votes. This is merely
an informal statement of our thesis; in Part II, we explain it more rigorously and
examine qualifications and limitations, including conditions under which the
costs of considering other judges' votes exceed the benefits.
It is important to be clear about what we have not claimed. First, we suggest
only that an argument based on the votes of other judges should be a legally
admissible consideration for any given judge. We certainly do not suggest that
any such argument must be conclusive, all things considered. The argument
would have to be weighed against other admissible arguments. The question is
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just whether arguments of this sort should be legally cognizable at all. The body
of Chevron precedent from the Supreme Court is overwhelmingly solipsistic.
Each Justice behaves as though the judicial duty is to resolutely ignore what
other Justices think, as though each is Judge Hercules. Yet this practice has
never been given a theoretical defense, as far as we can see.
Second, we have not yet considered any dynamic complications, such as
strategic behavior by Justices who know the rules and attempt to game the
system by claiming to hold views they actually do not hold. For now, we
assume truthful disclosure of judgments by all concerned, and we postpone
consideration of strategic behavior and other complications until Part II.
Hardercases. Now let us consider some variants and more difficult cases:
* In the previous case, five Justices thought that the statute clearly means
X, four that it clearly means Y. Now suppose instead that at the
conference after oral argument, five Justices say that the statute clearly
means X, and four say that it is ambiguous as between X and Y. Should
the five obtain some information from the votes of the four, albeit not as
much as in the previous case? After all, the four do not agree that the
statute clearly means X. And how about vice-versa-should the four
update their own views, in light of the views of the five?
* Suppose, instead, that four Justices believe that the statute clearly means
X, and four that it clearly means Y. The swing Justice believes the
statute is ambiguous, so the agency wins. The Court as a whole behaves
as though "it" believes that the statute is ambiguous. Yet if the proposition "the statute is ambiguous" were put to a vote within the group, that
proposition would lose by a vote of 8-1.
* In this last case, a further puzzle arises. What exactly is the holding of
the Court? Testing this doctrinal question would involve the Brand X
decision, 12 which holds-roughly speaking-that if the court holds the
statute ambiguous, agencies are free to switch their interpretation back
and forth, over time, within the zone of the ambiguity. 13 For purposes of
the Brand X rules, what are we to make of the vote in the case
described? Is the conclusion that the statute is ambiguous, so that the
agency may flip back and forth as future administrations come and go?
If so, is that a sensible result, given that an overwhelming supermajority
of the Court, eight out of nine, thought the statute unambiguous?
* Note, however, that if the two-stage voting procedure we suggest were
followed, this problem might disappear naturally. Once all Justices see
that the Court is riven on the direction of the putatively clear meaning, a
majority of Justices may adopt the view of the swing Justice that the

12. Nat'l Cable & Telecomm. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967 (2005).
13. Id. at 982-83.
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statute is ambiguous, and the decision will be quite ordinary for purposes of the Brand X rules.
Interpretive theories and second-order discretion. So far we have assumed
that all Justices are using a common interpretive theory. In the examples, we

have assumed that the Justices are all trying to determine the ordinary meaning
of the text. But puzzles also arise at the metalevel of competing approaches to
interpretation. What if the Justices have different theories? Can they nonetheless

extract useful information from votes of others across the methodological
divide?
Recall the case in which five Justices think the statute clearly means X and
four think that the statute clearly means Y.This need not mean, necessarily, that
all nine base their view on ordinary meaning; let us relax that assumption and
see what happens. Suppose that the five Justices are purposivists who think that
a combination of text and purpose clearly suggests X, and the four are textualists who think that the ordinary meaning of the text clearly indicates Y (or

vice-versa). Does this wrinkle undermine the argument for interdependent
voting and for deference to the agency?
On our view, epistemic humility should extend to the metalevel as well, at

least presumptively. All nine Justices should recognize that reasonable minds
can disagree about the proper approach to interpretation, at least within conventional boundaries that comfortably include self-identified textualists, selfidentified purposivists, self-identified intentionalists, and various hybrids. 14 The
federal judiciary has always contained multiple theoretical types-and, of course,
a much larger cadre of judges who muddle along in eclectic fashion, with no
explicit theory of interpretation at all. It would be unpardonably sectarian to
single out some particular theory and then brand all others unreasonable.
Second-order discretion and agency interpretation. On this approach, agen-

cies will have second-order discretion to choose among reasonable interpretive
approaches. As always in law, the boundaries of the methodologically "reasonable" are implicitly filled in by convention and practice; textualism and purposivism are acceptable, but the master principle that directs judges to interpret
statutes so as to "advance the cause of socialism" 15 is not. Yet there is no live

issue here; no agency is proposing to use any wildly nonstandard interpretive
methodology. The real-world consequence of second-order discretion is that
agencies would win whenever the discrepancies between reasonable methodological differences make a difference. Unless all reasonable methodologies point in
the same direction, indicating that the agency's view is clearly unreasonable, the
agency may choose which approach to follow. On this logic, the agency wins
not because the statute is ambiguous within any particular interpretive approach,

14. For an overview of standard interpretive theories, see WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., PHILIP P
& ELIZABETH GARRETT, LEGISLATION AND STATUTORY INTERPRETATION (2006).
15. Mark Tushnet, The Dilemmas of Liberal Constitutionalism,42 OHIO ST. L.J. 411, 424 (1981).

FRICKEY

2016]

THE VOTES OF OTHER JUDGES

but because there is second-order ambiguity in the choice of interpretive
approaches.
The argument for second-order interpretive discretion would fail if one
assumed that "textualists" and "purposivists" inhabit different methodological
universes, so that judges in one camp would obtain no information from
considering the views of judges in the other. That isn't how legal interpretation
works, however. Purposivist judges are certainly interested in text and canons,
in part because those things supply evidence of the purposes that a reasonable
legislator might have. 16 Conversely, many textualist judges, like Justice Holmes, have been willing to examine legislative history and other extratextual
sources as evidence that might shed light on the ordinary meaning of text. 17
But even when textualist judges entirely disavow considerations of purpose
and sources such as legislative history, there is a large area of overlap between
the textualist approach to interpretation and that of purposivist judges. Schematically, it is not the case that textualist judges consider sources or arguments {A,
B, C} while purposivist judges consider sources or arguments {D, E, F}. Rather
closer to the truth is a schema in which textualists consider {A, B, C1 while
purposivists consider {B, C, D}, or even {A, B, C, D}. There is a substantial
overlap in the sources used by all the major camps of interpretive theory. This
overlap of sources implies that judges in both camps will often gain relevant
information-relevant even to their own theories-from observing the votes of
other judges, even judges in other camps, insofar as those other judges are
considering the same sources. And again, many judges are not theoretical at all
and just consider all sources and arguments in a sort of promiscuous jumble.
Judges who have a theory at all obviously consider that theory to be correct.
Under the Chevron framework, however, even if a given judge thinks she is
correct, the question she has to answer is whether she thinks the other person's
view is not only wrong, but is actually unreasonable. The whole point of Chevron is to create space for that distinction. At the metalevel, then, Chevron implies that agencies should have a kind of second-order discretion to
choose among reasonable theories of interpretation.
As a matter of administrative law, arbitrariness review under section 706 of
the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) may place independent constraints on
the agency's ability to select among even reasonable interpretive approaches.
Suppose that an agency were to profess textualism in one case and then profess
purposivism in the next, always choosing the methodological stance that happens to allow it to take advantage of the second-order discretion over interpretive approaches that we have suggested. Courts might well ask the agency to
give reasons to justify its shifting methodological stance, as a matter of arbitrariness review. So it is not as though all constraints are absent. But agencies need

16. See John F. Manning, What Divides Textualists from Purposivists?, 106 COLUM. L. REv. 70,
78-91 (2006) (exploring common ground between textualists and purposivists).
17. See, e.g., Boston Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 278 U.S. 41, 48 (1928).
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not be tied down to any particular, sectarian theory of interpretation, within the
conventionally defined set of reasonable theories.
B. OTHER DOCTRINAL CONTEXTS

So far we have focused on Chevron settings, in which the interdependence
problem is both obvious and important. In this Section, we will expand the lens
to consider some other contexts in which interdependence problems arise. These
contexts are complex in our sense; they involve legal rules that themselves refer
to clarity and attach legal consequences to its presence or absence. We will
attempt to show that problems of interdependent voting are pervasive in law, but
that law takes no consistent approach to such problems. Sometimes law explicitly calls upon judges to consider the votes of colleagues, but other times it is
oblivious to the issue.

Qualified immunity. The law of qualified immunity is explicitly complex in
our sense: the prevailing test itself incorporates reasonable disagreement among
judges into the analysis. Qualified immunity means that government officials
performing discretionary functions are "shielded from liability for civil damages
insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitu' The "reasontional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." 18
ableness" test has been cashed out by taking substantial disagreement among
judges as all-but-conclusive evidence that the underlying rights were not clearly
established.
The controlling case is Wilson v. Layne, decided in 1999.19 The underlying
issue was whether the Fourth Amendment is violated when police executing an
arrest warrant in a private home bring along reporters. The Court, through Chief
Justice Rehnquist, said that "media ride-alongs" are indeed unconstitutional in
such circumstances, yet the opinion went on to afford qualified immunity to the
officers involved.2 ° In a crucial passage, the Court observed that:
Between the time of the events of this case and today's decision, a split
among the Federal Circuits in fact developed on the question whether media
ride-alongs that enter homes subject the police to money damages.... If
judges thus disagree on a constitutional question, it is unfair to subject
police
21
to money damages for picking the losing side of the controversy.
Later cases have followed Wilson in this regard, making disagreement among
appellate courts a powerful indicator that the legal rules were not clearly

established at the time of the official action.22 Qualified immunity, then, is an

18. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).
19. 526 U.S. 603 (1999).
20. Id. at 611-14.
21. Id. at 618 (internal citations omitted).
22. See, e.g., Reichle v. Howards, 132 S. Ct. 2088, 2096-97 (2012); Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S.
223, 245 (2009).
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area in which the law already, and explicitly, takes into account the information
supplied by the votes of other judges.
The opinions in Wilson also featured another argument from judicial voting,
with an entirely different valence. Justice Stevens, the only Justice to vote that
the law was clearly established, so that qualified immunity should not be
afforded, observed that the Court had voted unanimously on the underlying
substantive question; every Justice believed that media ride-alongs during execution of arrest warrants in a private home violated the Fourth Amendment.2 3
Stevens argued that this unanimity was powerful evidence that the law was
indeed clearly established at the time of the police action: "That the Court today
speaks with a single voice on the merits of the constitutional question is unusual
and certainly lends support to the notion that the question is indeed 'open and
24
shut.'
No other Justice accepted this argument-indeed the opinion for the Court
ignored it altogether-but it is hardly obvious that it is wrong, at least in the
modest form Stevens advanced, in which the Court's unanimity merely "lends
support" to the conclusion that the law is clearly established. On a two-stage
decision procedure, we might imagine the Justices first voting on the merits of
the underlying constitutional issue, examining each others' votes, and then
using the information obtained as an input to the second-stage vote about
whether the law was clearly established. We will examine such arguments more
rigorously in Part II. Suffice it to say here that Justice Stevens's argument is
closely related to James Fitzjames Stephen's argument, mentioned earlier, that a
jury deciding whether there is a "reasonable doubt" should take into account the
information supplied by each other's votes.
"New rules" and retroactivityon habeas. Since Teague v. Lane, the Court has

held that "new rules" of criminal procedure may not be "retroactively" enforced
against the states through federal habeas corpus petitions. If the rule was not
in place when the conviction became final, states are immune from collateral
attack on that ground. But what counts as a new rule? A rule is new unless it
was "dictated by then-existing precedent" at the time of conviction, so that the
invalidity of the conviction would have been apparent to "all reasonable jurists." 26 Patently, this is a complex rule in our sense, one that invites consideration of observed disagreement among judges, at least as an indicator of
whether reasonable jurists agree. The test, that is, invites consideration of the
votes of other judges.

23. Wilson, 526 U.S. at 620 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
24. Id.
25. 489 U.S. 288, 310 (1989). Similar questions arise under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), providing that
state court decisions may not be challenged on habeas unless (as relevant here) they violate "clearly
established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States." The statute applies
only to state convictions finalized after 1996, whereas Teague also applies to federal convictions.
26. Lambrix v. Singletary, 520 U.S. 518, 527-28 (1997).
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In Beard v. Banks, the Court made the logic explicit.2 7 The habeas petitioner
was attempting to enforce a rule announced in a previous 5-4 decision. The
Court held that the dissenting votes were evidence of reasonable disagreement
among jurists, so that the rule of the earlier decision must have been new and
could not be enforced in habeas proceedings. 28 The Court was careful not to say
that the bare fact of disagreement necessarily proved that reasonable jurists
could differ-perhaps the dissenters were unreasonable-but it treated the
existence of substantial dissent as strong evidence. 29 It thereby gave the votes of
other judges great weight, if not necessarily decisive weight. After Beard v.
Banks, lower court cases have followed suit, treating dissents as evidence of a
"new rule" not dictated by precedent.30
Mandamus. The extraordinary writ of mandamus invites consideration of the
votes of other judges because it contains a built-in requirement that the legal
violation for which relief is granted must be clear or plain.3 1 If there is
disagreement on a multijudge panel, it is open to one side or the other to argue
that the disagreement itself shows that the issue must not be clear. We have been
unable to find such an argument appearing in the decided cases.
However, an interesting variant appeared in United States ex rel. Chicago
Great Western R.R. Co. v. ICC.32 The petitioners sought a writ of mandamus to
compel the Interstate Commerce Commission to take jurisdiction over their
complaint for administrative redress, a complaint that in the view of a majority
33
of the Commission was outside its administrative authority (its "jurisdiction").
The Court refused to issue the writ, in part because disagreement within the
Commission indicated the existence of a disputable question, so that there was
no "plain and palpable" error in the Commission's decision.34 In the Court's
words:
[I]t must appear that the administrative tribunal was plainly and palpably
wrong in refusing to take jurisdiction.... [The ICC] decision was not unanimous; certain of the members being of the opinion that the power to grant the
relief demanded could be spelled out of the [A]ct .... This statement of the
views of the Commission indicates that its conclusion was not so clearly

27. 542 U.S. 406 (2004).
28. See id. at 415-16. This assumes, as the Court also held, that neither of the two exceptions to the
Teague bar applied.
29. See id. at 416 n.5.
30. See, e.g., United States v. Amer, 681 F.3d 211, 213 (5th Cir. 2012); Valentine v. United States,
488 F.3d 325, 328-30 (6th Cir. 2007); see also O'Dell v. Netherland, 95 F.3d 1214, 1224-38 (4th Cir.
1996), aff'd, 521 U.S. 151 (1997). For limitations on the use of dissents as evidentiary of a "new rule,"
see Butler v. Curry, 528 F.3d 624, 636-38 (9th Cir. 2008).
31. See Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court for D.C., 542 U.S. 367, 380-81 (2004).
32. 294 U.S. 50, 62 (1935) (on mandamus for legal error).
33. Id. at 60.
34. Id. at 62.
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erroneous as to call for the exercise of the extraordinary power involved in the
issuance of mandamus.35
Mandamus is thus a half-way example: the Court has in effect considered the
votes of administratorson a multimember tribunal as information for judges to
consider when casting their own votes on subsequent review.
Constitutionalconventions (in court). Constitutional conventions-using the
phrase in the Commonwealth sense, rather than the American sense-are
unwritten constitutional norms that are supposed to depend upon a widespread
consensus about their existence and legitimacy. 36 Their principal function is to
regulate the extrajudicial behavior of political actors. In some Commonwealth
jurisdictions, however, courts will recognize conventions, although they will not
enforce them.3 7
The consensus that is supposed to underpin conventions would dissolve, ipso
facto, if there were sufficient disagreement about whether the convention exists.
What then happens when judges disagree about the very existence of a convention? As Jon Elster writes about a decision of the Supreme Court of Canada, 38
"[w]hen only six out of nine judges said that the [constitutional convention] in
question existed, doesn't that prove that it didn't? And what if [it] had been a
five to four decision? ' 39 Here too, the existence of a convention is the sort of
question we have called complex, such that disagreement is itself evidential on
the question.
Disagreement among experts. Disagreement among judges is just a special
case of disagreement among experts, for judges are supposed to be experts in
law. In a number of legal settings, disagreement among nonjudicial experts also
amounts to evidence that judges use in answering legal questions. The main
public law setting involves the administrative state, where experts usually travel
in packs. Advisory panels of experts, created by agencies under the Federal
Advisory Committee Act or created directly by organic statutes, will often
deliberate as a group, sometimes voting explicitly on factual or causal propositions or policy recommendations; the statute may oblige the agency to consider
and respond to the panel's views before reaching a decision.40 On another
dimension, there are experts on the agency staff who may or may not agree with

35. Id.
at 62-63.
36. See generally Adrian Vermeule, Conventions in Court, 38 DUBLIN U. L.J. 283, 283-310 (2015)
[hereinafter Vermeule, Conventions in Court];Adrian Vermeule, Conventions of Agency Independence,
113 COLUM. L. REv. 1163 (2013) [hereinafter Vermeule, Conventions of Agency Independence].
37. Vermeule, Conventions in Court, supra note 36, at 292-94; Vermeule, Conventions of Agency
Independence, supra note 36, at 1228-31.
38. Resolution to Amend the Constitution, [1981] 1 S.C.R. 753 [Patriation Reference].
39. Elster, supra note 2, at 26.
40. See, e.g., Clean Air Act § 109(d)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 7409(d)(2) (2012) (establishing the Clean Air
Scientific Advisory Committee, an independent scientific advisory committee that advises EPA on
scientific and technical aspects of air quality criteria and national ambient air quality standards).
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experts on advisory panels or with experts hired by regulated parties challenging agency decisions.
When experts disagree, agencies have more freedom to maneuver as a legal
matter. Absent a strong professional consensus, agencies are usually free to
adopt any view that has some nontrivial constituency among reasonable and
qualified experts. In the decided cases, the issue arises when courts conduct
arbitrariness review under section 706 of the APA.4 1 In these circumstances,
Marsh v. Oregon Natural Resources Council held that "[w]hen specialists express conflicting views, an agency must have discretion to rely on the reasonable opinions of its own qualified experts even if, as an original matter, a court
might find contrary views more persuasive. 4 2 Expert disagreement is itself
evidence that the agency's view, whether or not correct, is at least reasonable
and therefore lawful.
Contractlaw. Complex rules play an important role in contract interpretation.
Many courts hold that when the meaning of a contract is "clear," extrinsic
evidence offered to show a different meaning may not be introduced.4 3 Imagine
that a three-judge appellate court must determine whether a lower court judge
erred by excluding extrinsic evidence based on the clear meaning of the
contract. One of the appellate judges believes that the contract has clear
meaning X, while another of the appellate judges believes that the contract has
clear meaning Y. Should the third judge conclude that therefore the contract
does not have a clear meaning and accordingly that the extrinsic evidence
should be introduced? If so, extrinsic evidence will be introduced even though a
majority of judges believe that it should not be. The question is complex in our
sense.
The rule of lenity. We end by coming full circle, with an example-like
Chevron-of a canon of construction as to which courts might well draw upon
the votes of other judges, but have not done so. Under the rule of lenity, courts
at least in principle construe ambiguous criminal statutes in favor of defendants.
Unless criminal liability is clear, it is not supposed to exist at all. However, the
Supreme Court has been inconsistent over time in its treatment of the canon. In

41. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2012).
42. 490 U.S. 360, 378 (1989). Technically speaking, Marsh involved a kind of hybrid arbitrariness
review under the National Environmental Policy Act, see id. at 373-76, but courts treat the two settings
similarly, and lower courts have applied Marsh's point about expert disagreement in standard arbitrariness review under the APA. See, e.g., Kroger Co. v. Reg'l Airport Auth. of Louisville & Jefferson Cty.,
286 E3d 382, 390 (6th Cir. 2002) (holding that agency had "discretion to rely upon the reasonably
supported opinion of its expert" and did not act arbitrarily or capriciously in doing so); Aluminum Co.
of Am. v. Adm'r, Bonneville Power Admin., 175 F.3d 1156, 1161-62 (9th Cir. 1999) (rejecting
challenge to agency action that "reflect[ed] primarily a difference of opinion among experts"); Hopi
Tribe v. Navajo Tribe, 46 E3d 908, 915 (9th Cir. 1995) (refusing to "reweigh the relative cogency of
conflicting expert views" in challenge to the Bureau of Indian Affairs' determination of rental value of
homesites).
43. See, e.g., W.W.W. Assocs. v. Giancontieri, 566 N.E.2d 639, 642 (N.Y. 1990).
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many cases, the Court refers to the canon as a mere tiebreaker, 44 to be invoked
only if all other interpretive sources are in equipoise-which they rarely are.
As Will Baude points out, the rule of lenity would be suitable terrain for
interdependent judicial voting for the same reasons that Chevron would be
suitable terrain. 45 After all, if the vote on the Court is 5-4 in favor of construing
a criminal statute to cover the defendant's conduct, shouldn't the five Justices in
the majority pause to ask whether the dissent testifies to the existence of
reasonable disagreement? And if so, under the rule of lenity, why doesn't it
follow that the statute should be construed in the defendant's favor? However,
as Baude also points out, the Court never points to the votes4 6of other judges in
this setting, although it does in areas like qualified immunity.
Our list of complex questions might be multiplied indefinitely. One might
consider the doctrine that an agency's interpretation of its own regulations
prevails unless "plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation"; 47 the
appellate standard of review for lower court findings of fact, which also stand
unless clearly erroneous; 48 and various doctrines of "reasonable expectations"
in Fourth Amendment law, 4 9 insurance law, 50 and elsewhere. In any of these
contexts, judicial disagreement might be taken as evidence of whether the legal
test has or has not been satisfied, although we are not aware of cases specifically
holding one way or another in these settings. Regardless, our larger point is
clear: complex questions and problems of interdependent voting are pervasive
in law, across doctrinal areas and across the divide between public and private
law. It is also clear that law has no unified approach to such problems, which are
treated haphazardly by judges seemingly unaware of their common structure.
Such an approach might, of course, suggest that the problems should be treated
differently in different settings, depending upon local circumstances and variables; but that sort of intelligent, deliberate localism would be very different
than the ad hoc treatment that currently holds sway.

44. See, e.g., Barber v. Thomas, 560 U.S. 474, 488 (2010); Reno v. Koray, 515 U.S. 50, 64-65
(1995); Callanan v. United States, 364 U.S. 587, 596 (1961). For a general discussion of the Court's
changing treatment of the rule of lenity over time, see Lawrence M. Solan, Law, Language, and Lenity,
40WM. & MARY L. REv. 57, 89-115 (1998).
45. Baude, supra note 6.
46. Id.
47. Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 414 (1945).
48. FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a)(6).
49. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360-62 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring) (articulating
"reasonable expectation of privacy" test).
50. See Robert E. Keeton, Insurance Law Rights at Variance with Policy Provisions, 83 HARv. L.
REV. 961, 967 (1970) ("The objectively reasonable expectations of applicants and intended beneficiaries
regarding the terms of insurance contracts will be honored even though painstaking study of the policy
provisions would have negated those expectations."); Mark C. Rahdert, Reasonable Expectations
Revisited, 5 CONN. INS. L.J. 107, 115-44 (1998) (articulating four versions of the "reasonable expectations" guide to insurance contract interpretation).
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DIMENSIONS OF THE PROBLEM

It is time to regroup. The examples have multiple strands and dimensions. We
should identify and disentangle some of them, before moving on to offer our
theory in Part II.
Simple and complex questions. The world is full of first-order legal questions
that are "simple" in our sense, although in a colloquial sense they may of course
be complicated. Under the APA, what is the default standard of proof in
administrative proceedings? Judges may look around and see how their colleagues have voted on that question, or they may not. Call that the "simple
question" of interdependent judicial voting.
However, there is also a special class of "complex" questions, in which the
legal rule itself points to the question of disagreement within the class of voting
judges (or jurors, or administrators, and so on). Complex legal rules require that
some primary legal determination-such as, under Chevron, whether the agency
is acting within the bounds of its statutory authority-be not only decided, but
decided clearly one way or another. In other words, under Chevron, agencies
must be clearly wrong or they are not wrong at all. Disagreement within the
group of voting judges, however that group is defined, will accordingly amount
to some evidence that the requirement of clarity is not satisfied. The evidence is
not conclusive, but we believe that it should generally be consulted, unless there
are special systemic reasons in a given domain to believe that the costs of doing
so outweigh the benefits.
The Supreme Court and other actors. Further complications arise when we
consider the relationship between the Supreme Court and other legal actors,
such as lower courts or administrative agencies. In most of our paradigm
Chevron cases, we focused on Justices of the Court obtaining information from
the votes of other Justices. How far do the relevant considerations generalize
when the question is whether, say, a Justice should consider the votes of lower
court judges? Recall the example of King v. Burwell,5 1 in which six of nine
lower court judges had voted in the government's favor; should the Justices take
those votes into account when deciding whether the agency is clearly wrong?
Or what of United States ex rel. Chicago Great Western R.R. v. ICC,S2 in which
the Court took into account disagreement among administrators to decide
whether mandamus was clearly warranted-is this different from the lower
court example? Does the relevant information have to come from the votes of
other judges, or will any decision maker do? What about a poll of law
professors, practicing lawyers, or people on the street about whether the statute
is clear-should the Justices take such information into account?
First-orderand second-orderdisagreement.We have seen problems in which
disagreement arises at the first order ("does this statutory provision mean X or
Y?"). As we have also seen, however, disagreement may arise at the second
51. See supra text accompanying note 5.
52. See supra notes 32-35 and accompanying text.

2016]

THE VOTES OF OTHER JUDGES

order as well ("what interpretive methods should we use to determine whether
this statutory provision means X or Y?"). We will have to take both levels into
account-although it is perfectly possible to suggest, and we will indeed
suggest, that judges should take the reasonable disagreement of colleagues into
account at both levels.
Modal status. Finally, we need to be precise about the modal status of the
votes of other judges. We might imagine three very different positions: (1) A
given judge is required to consider the information contained in the votes of
other judges; such votes are a mandatory legal source, binding on every judge.
(2) A given judge is permitted but not required to consider the votes of other
judges. (3) A given judge is forbidden from considering the votes of other
judges. Of course, the choice between (1), (2), and (3) may be made on an
issue-by-issue basis, not globally. The current Court chooses among these
haphazardly on an issue-by-issue basis, as we have seen. It is high time
someone laid out a comprehensive account of the problem; we will attempt to
do so in the next Part.
II. A THEORY

OF INTERDEPENDENT VOTING

The puzzles are endless. Clearly some sort of analytic framework is needed,
and basic decision theory supplies one. We will start with a simple baseline
account, assuming judges with common preferences but disparate imperfect
information must aggregate their judgments. We then move on to consider more
complex possibilities, especially scenarios in which judges engage in rational
epistemic free riding on each other's efforts at information gathering and
information processing.
A.

SIMPLE AND COMPLEX QUESTIONS WITH RATIONAL JUDGES

Let us begin with what we have called a "simple question." Nine judges must
decide whether it is per se negligent to text while driving. In a straw poll, eight
judges vote yes, and one judge votes no. Should any of the judges change her
vote?
The answer depends on what the purpose of voting is and how much
information the judges have. As a first approximation, however, the ninth judge
has good reason to change her mind. The issue before the court raises a range of
factual, institutional, and policy questions about which no one has perfect
information. Imagine that the ninth judge has never texted while driving, while
the others have. The ninth judge may accordingly learn from the other judges
that texting is a distracting activity that could plausibly be regarded as negligent
when driving. The question also raises institutional issues about the relationship
between legislation and the common law. Suppose that among the judges, the
ninth judge alone lacks an understanding of legislative reactions when judges
embody statutes in common law doctrines. There is also the policy question of
whether such a rule produces good outcomes or instead is evaded or produces
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perverse consequences. Here, again, the ninth judge may find herself in the
minority because she has thought little about these incentive effects.
On the other side, the ninth judge may be sufficiently confident in her views
about these questions, or sufficiently skeptical about the wisdom of the other
judges, that she will rationally refuse to change her mind. There may also be
value in recording a dissenting vote so that, in the future, courts and legislatures
know that the panel's view was not unanimous. Finally, changing one's vote
becomes less rational as the vote becomes closer. If, for example, the vote is
5-4, the judges in the minority could reasonably believe that they are right and
the majority is wrong. Exactly how these considerations cash out may depend
on circumstances.5 3 But it is straightforward that a judge in the minority may
change her vote, and should change her vote, unless she has significant selfconfidence or can cite other institutional considerations. We do not suggest that
judges must always or necessarily change their votes in light of the votes of
colleagues. But there exist some conditions under which they should do so.
If this argument seems straightforward, however, its implications for complex
questions are not. Imagine now that the nine judges must decide whether a
statute is clear or unclear, and if it is clear, what its meaning is. Five judges vote
that the statute clearly has meaning X, while four judges vote that the statute
clearly has meaning Y. As above, the latter four judges probably do not have
reason to change their votes to X. Each judge in the minority might think her
judgment superior to the views of the majority, and the common agreement
among a large minority might fortify that determination. However, in this case,
we believe that all nine judges should change their minds and vote that the
statute is unclear. (If it is a Chevron case, the agency's view will then prevail,
assuming that view is reasonable).
Why exactly? Imagine an experiment in which a subject is asked to observe a
group of people who independently interpret a single text. The text could be a
law, and the members of the group are asked to apply the law to an agreed-upon
set of facts and to write down their answers. The subject is not informed about
the law or facts but is given the answers and is asked the single question: "Is the
law clear?" If the answers are all different, then the subject will properly answer
that the law is not clear; if the answers are the same, then the subject will
answer that the law is clear. If some of the answers are the same and some are
different, then the answer will depend on the ratio of identical answers to total
answers, with a higher ratio indicating that the law is clear or relatively clear.

53. In statistical terms, the judge seeks to estimate the correct outcome of the case based on
information that is available. The judge's information, based on the judge's own experience, provides a
partial basis for that estimate, but the judge can improve her estimate by sampling from other judges'
votes. Reliance on the votes of additional judges reduces the influence of randomness (for example, a
judge has a bad day or idiosyncratic experiences) on the outcome because the random factors that affect
different judges' votes cancel out. For a lucid discussion of the underlying statistical reasoning, see
Hillel J. Bavli, The Logic of Comparable-Case Guidance in the Determination of Awards for Pain and
Suffering and Punitive Damages,U. CIN. L. REv. (forthcoming 2016) (manuscript at 11-20).
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The reason that the subject would answer in this way is itself clear. If the
group members are working independently, then the probability that they will
all provide the same answer to an unclear text rapidly approaches zero as the
size of the group increases.5 4 As an even simpler analogy, imagine that a coin is
flipped and the group members are either shown or not shown the coin before
being asked to report heads or tails if they see the coin and to guess if they do
not. If everyone in the group reports the same answer to the observer, then the
observer knows with a high degree of confidence that the group members
actually saw the coin flip.55 If there are differences, then the observer knows
that the group members did not see the coin flip and guessed.
Returning to the earlier example, we might ask, "What if the subject is also
allowed to see the text? Would it be rational for her to allow her own view about
whether it is clear or unclear trump the information she derives from the votes
of the group?" The answer is no. The subject should realize that she and the
group members have different experiences and other sources of information that
they bring to bear on the text.5 6 While the text may look clear to her, that may
just be because she is unaware of other legitimate perspectives on the text or of
words or phrases in the text that have specialized meanings as terms of art. We
do not see any important differences between these examples and the judicial
setting. If our subjects should be influenced by the judgments of the group
members, then judges should be influenced by the votes of other judges.
B. CONFIDENCE LEVELS

As noted above, a judge's vote in a case, if sincere, reflects her view about
how it should be decided, but it does not reveal her level of confidence. But if
judges rely on votes for information, they should be concerned about the
confidence level of votes as well as their directions-the magnitude as well as
the sign. In this Section, we elaborate on this point, assuming for simplicity
54.

See Marquis de Condorcet, Essay on the Application of Mathematics to the Theory of

Decision-Making, in CONDORCET: SELECTED WRITINGS 33, 48-49 (Keith Michael Baker ed., 1976)

(Condorcet Jury Theorem). When we say "independently," we are using that word in the technical
sense, meaning that each voter's decision is not affected by the decisions of other voters. (Formally, the
accuracy of the vote of any given voter X is the same as the conditional accuracy of X's vote, given Y's
vote-meaning that X's accuracy is unaffected by whatever Y does). Independence is reduced to the
extent that voters rely on a common source of information but the theorem continues to hold, albeit
more weakly, as long as the votes are not perfectly correlated. For a lucid discussion, see Krishna K.
Ladha, The Condorcet Jury Theorem, Free Speech, and Correlated Votes, 36 AM. J. POL. Sci. 617,
622-25 (1992). For the time being, we will assume for the sake of simplicity that votes are independent. In the real world, that condition often fails to hold, as Ladha explains. In Section II.D, we
consider more directly problems that arise when the independence assumption is violated.
55. If there are five members in the group, the probability that all five would correctly guess the coin
flip without seeing the coin is about 3%. If there are ten members, the probability is less than 0.1%.
56. This point is an established one in the economics of information, as illustrated by, for example,
the no-trade theorem, which is based on the premise that traders will rationally update their valuations
of an asset based on the price offered by counterparties. A counterparty's offer reveals information that
the initial party may not have. See Paul Milgrom & Nancy Stokey, Information, Trade and Common
Knowledge, 26 J. ECON. THEORY 17, 17 (1982).
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throughout that the statute has only two possible meanings-X or Y.
Imagine that each judge reads the statute and the briefs and reaches a
preliminary conclusion about the meaning of the statue. The judge also has a
level of confidence (high, low, middling) about her own interpretation. For
example, a judge might believe that the meaning is X with a probability of 0.99,
0.9, 0.6, 0.5, or 0.1 (which is the same as saying that she believes the meaning is
not-X with a probability of 0.01, 0.1, 0.4, 0.5, or 0.9). A judge with a high
confidence level believes that the statute is clear; a judge with a confidence level
in the neighborhood of 0.5 believes that the statute is ambiguous.
A judge should update her initial judgment in light of the information that she
receives from the other judges. 5 7 If voting is sequential, then each judge should
update based on the judges who voted before her. If voting is simultaneous, then
such updating is not possible immediately-but let us suppose that our suggestion for a two-stage voting procedure is adopted, so that judges can change their
votes in a second round of voting, after an initial straw poll.
Each judge should then take into account not only the number of votes for
each interpretation, but the confidence level of the judges who cast those votes.
A judge's vote for X with confidence level 0.51 is not as informative about the
meaning of the statute as a judge's votes for X with confidence level 0.9. It may,
however, be difficult to gauge confidence levels-it is certainly more difficult to
gauge confidence level than to understand the vote itself. We can imagine that
judges may try to reveal their confidence level in deliberations preceding or
accompanying the voting process ("I'm really not sure, but for the moment, X
seems more plausible to me"). This may not always happen, but for the moment
let us assume that judges both vote sincerely and are able to reveal sincerely
their level of confidence, either orally in conference or by writing in judicial
opinions.
We may then consider, for illustrative purposes, a number of possible scenarios.
(1) If the initial vote reveals a 5-4 split in favor of meaning X, and all judges
(sincerely) claim to be confident, then they should all certainly update their
views. How they should update their views is complicated and fact dependent.
If you are confident enough, then you should presumptively not update your
views; but if enough people are arrayed against you, and they are confident as
well, then you should. But in this example, it seems that each judge should
abandon her initial view that the statute is clear and adopt the view that the
statute is ambiguous (or equivalently, that the statute has meaning X or Y with
probability close to 0.5).
(2) The second case involves a 5-4 split where the five judges in the majority
believe that the statute clearly means X, and the four other judges say that the
statute is ambiguous. Let's suppose that this means that the five judges in the

57. Cognoscenti will recognize our informal reliance on Bayes' rule. In Bayesian terms, the judge's
initial interpretation is her prior, which she updates in light of the additional information she receives
from the votes of other judges.
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majority believe that with probability 0.9 the statute means X, and the four other
judges believe with probability 0.5 that the statute means Y (and of course
probability 0.5 that it means X). The four judges should adopt the view that
the statute means X, though with less confidence than the five judges. The five
judges should reduce their confidence level slightly. The upshot is that all nine
judges vote that the statute clearly means X.5 8 In this example, although the
bottom line result is the same as it would be without updating, the grounds on
which it was reached and the confidence levels of the group's members have
changed materially, so the votes of other judges have still been informative.
(3) Suppose that all nine judges believe that the statute is ambiguous, but they
incline toward X (say, with confidence level 0.65).

9

It is tempting to argue that

all nine judges should vote that the statute is ambiguous. However, this is
incorrect. If they observe each other's vote and confidence level, and also
believe that each judge's view is independently arrived at, then they should
update their beliefs and conclude that the probability that the correct meaning is
X is substantially higher in virtue of the Jury Theorem.60
Our analysis reveals some surprising results, illustrating the complexity of
aggregating individual judgments into a collective view. If all judges believe
that the statute is ambiguous, but are mildly inclined towards the same interpretation, then the statute is actually unambiguous. If all judges believe that the
statute is clear, but disagree about its meaning, then the statute is actually
ambiguous. This explains why it is important for judges to pay attention to the
votes of other judges.
We can also use our analysis to resolve a seeming paradox about jury
decision making, the one we mentioned at the outset.6 1 Suppose that seven
jurors believe that the defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, and four
jurors believe that the defendant is not. Should the seven jurors revise their
judgment because guilt cannot be beyond a reasonable doubt if four presumptively reasonable people deny it?
The answer is that each juror should revise his belief in light of the belief and
confidence of the other jurors. The outcome would then depend on exactly what
those beliefs and confidence levels are. Suppose that each juror believes that
reasonable doubt is achieved if it is anything less than "nearly certain" that the
defendant is guilty. The seven jurors in the majority are "nearly certain" the
defendant is guilty, and the five other jurors are just "fairly sure" the defendant
58. Unless the threshold under Chevron for finding ambiguity is quite low. Whatever that threshold
is, we can modify our example to accommodate it.
59. We continue to assume that there is a fact of the matter about what the statute means, and that it
can mean only one of two things-X or Y.
60. What if the judges all believe that the statute is ambiguous and incline toward interpretation X,
but also think that interpretation Y (with slightly less probability) is also reasonable? Our inclination is
to think that they should still vote for X, but one might argue that they should hold that the statute is
ambiguous.
61. See Elster, supra note 2; see also STEPHEN, A HISTRY, supra note 7, at 560; STEPHEN, A GENERAL
VIEw, supra note 7, at 220-21.
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is guilty. If each juror reached his judgment independently, then the probability
of guilt is higher than the "fairly sure" level of the minority. In short, the seven
jurors in the majority may provide the "evidence" necessary to flip the minority
from "fairly sure" to "nearly certain." (This illustrates the same principle as

does example 3 above.) Accordingly, each juror should change his vote to
convict-if he can accurately gauge confidence levels.
The argument depends on the ability of judges and jurors to gauge the
confidence levels of other judges and jurors, at least in part. All else equal,

judges who belong to the same court and enjoy collegial relations will be in a
better position to gauge confidence levels than judges who belong to different
courts and must rely on votes embodied in judicial opinions. In the latter case,
the strength of our argument depends on whether judges candidly reveal their

level of confidence in judicial opinions. We suspect that sometimes they do-by
stating in the text their level of confidence ("this is a close case ' 62) and by
issuing concurrences and dissents. Sometimes they do not. But experienced
judges will often be able to tell the difference, sometimes relying on the
reputation of other judges.6 3
C. VOTES OR REASONS?

Why should judges count votes when they already, uncontroversially, take
into account the reasons of their colleagues? In the texting-while-driving example, the poorly informed judge could simply listen open mindedly to the
reasons offered by his colleagues ("I almost crashed into a tree while picking
through the emoticon selection") and make up his own mind accordingly. The
judge could also read the opinions written in earlier cases and either reject or be
persuaded by the reasons therein.
There are several answers to this question. First, reasons do not have a

dimension of number, but votes do. A reason is what it is, regardless of how
many subscribe to it. But under conditions of uncertain judgment, it is rational
to find a reason more persuasive if others do so as well. Knowing that many
other people who are presumptively reasonable are persuaded by a given reason
and have cast votes accordingly should strengthen our confidence in the validity
of the reason over and above the intrinsic quality of the reason itself.

62. The phrase "this is a close case" appears in 2,300 cases according to a search of the Westlaw
database performed on November 13, 2015. Various similar statements (such as "this is a difficult
case") also appear numerous times.
63. A complex and unintuitive implication of this argument is that-in principle-judges need to
take into account not only the confidence level of other judges, but also the extent to which those other
judges' votes were influenced by those judges' observations of still other judges' votes. Under certain
conditions, a judge should disregard a judge's vote because that judge is merely imitating other judges
whom the first judge is also imitating, leading to double-counting. In extreme cases, judges should
follow the minority rather than the majority. See Erik Eyster & Matthew Rabin, Extensive Imitation is
Irrationaland Harmful, 129 Q.J. EcON. 1861, 1889 (2014). In real-world conditions, however, with
judges laboring under constraints of time and information, the marginal decision costs of such an
ambitious approach will often exceed the marginal benefits in accuracy.
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Second, reasons are often crosscutting and multifarious. They often do not
point clearly in any direction, and they do not yield actual conclusions until they
are assigned weights or priority rankings. In a judicial opinion, the author
typically will list a number of reasons or considerations that point in different
directions before pronouncing a conclusion. Two precedents point one way but
are perhaps distinguishable; another precedent points in a different direction and
is perhaps less distinguishable; meanwhile the facts point in one direction but
policy considerations suggest a different conclusion. No algorithm provides a
method for aggregating these competing considerations, which must somehow
be assigned priorities or a dimension of weight; it is the conclusion, embodied
in the vote, that matters most. While judges should and do take account of
reasons, they must also take into account the conclusion. And when different
judges come to different conclusions-often based on an identical set of
considerations-the number and confidence level of each set of conclusions or
votes is highly informative.
Finally, a judge's vote is operational in a way that reasons are not. A vote
determines the outcome of the case-who wins and who loses-and the case's
precedential value. For this reason, the vote is more informative than the
reasons. Indeed, there is a long tradition of skepticism about the reasons that
judges give in their opinions.64 It has been frequently argued, for example, that
judges employ formalistic reasoning-purporting to derive outcomes from general rules that are too coarse to decide a case-while deciding cases on policy
grounds. Judges may either unconsciously or consciously (the topic of the next
Section) conceal their actual reasons by presenting phony reasons; they cannot
conceal their vote.
Still, it is possible that judges should disregard the votes of other judges
based on those judges' reasons. Two conditions must be satisfied. First, the first
judge disagrees with the reasons of the other judges. Second, the first judge
believes that the spurious reasons provided by the other judges actually motivated the other judges' votes. Imagine, for example, a judge says that he voted
in favor of meaning X because he received a phone call from Vladimir Putin
who ordered him to cast that vote. Another judge would do well to disregard the
vote if he believes the first judge. But in more realistic scenarios, judges may
disregard the reasons rather than the votes. Suppose that a judge explains that he
voted in favor of meaning X because he believes that legislative history
compels this meaning. Another judge, who believes that legislative history is
irrelevant, may be tempted to disregard the vote. However, as we just noted, the
judge might also doubt that the reason motivated the vote; people, including
judges, are notoriously bad at explaining their own motivations. And as we
noted in the introduction, the controversies over interpretive theory that preoc-

64. See GuDo CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 172-81 (1982); Scott C.
Idleman, A PrudentialTheory of Judicial Candor,73 TEX. L. REv. 1307 (1995). See generally David L.
Shapiro, In Defense of Judicial Candor, 100 HARV. L. REv. 731 (1987).
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cupy academics do not necessarily carry over to judicial decision making,

which is often more pragmatic in spirit. We suspect the two conditions are
rarely satisfied.65
D. STRATEGIC BEHAVIOR

1. The Problem
Throughout the previous Sections, we have assumed that judges vote
sincerely-meaning that their votes reflect their judgment about the proper
outcome of a case. But, of course, judges may also act strategically. 66 Strategic
voting can take many forms. A judge may vote inconsistently with her beliefs
because (1) she hopes that another judge will reciprocate and take her side in a
case of more importance to her; (2) she hopes to influence the agenda before the
court, including the order and timing of cases; (3) she wants to avoid the trouble
of writing a dissenting opinion; (4) she wants to avoid writing a politically
controversial opinion; and so on.6 7 A related problem, to which we will return
below, is that a judge may copy the votes of others so as to avoid having to
make her own judgment.68
Where judges consider the votes of colleagues as relevant information,
strategic behavior is undeniably possible in some cases. In our Chevron settings,
strategic judges might exploit the willingness of colleagues to take their votes
into account. The judge might, for example, falsely claim that she believes a
statute to be ambiguous. Under the approach we suggest, the false-claimer
might thereby push other sincere judges on the court towards deference to an
agency (assuming that to be the outcome desired by the strategic judge).
For several reasons, however, we doubt that the mere risk of strategic
behavior, by itself, creates a fatal problem for our proposal. The premise for the
whole conversation must be that judges are occasionally, but not uniformly,
strategic. If all voting is strategic, then it is idle to argue about how judges
"should" vote-idle both in this setting and throughout normative legal
theory as well. If, for example, all judges always act solely so as to
promote the interests of their political party, then it is idle to offer them

65. We thank Asher Steinberg for pressing us on this point.
66. See generally, e.g., LEE EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT, THE CHOICES JUSTICES MAKE (1998); WALTER F.
MURPHY, ELEMENTS OF JUDICIAL STRATEGY (1964); Lee Epstein & Tonja Jacobi, The StrategicAnalysis of
Judicial Decisions, 6 ANN. REv. L. SOC. SCi. 341 (2010). On strategic voting generally, see David

Austen-Smith & Jeffrey S. Banks, Information Aggregation, Rationality, and the Condorcet Jury
Theorem, 90 AM. POL. SCi. REv. 34 (1996).

67. For these and other examples of strategic behavior, see EPSTEIN & KNIGHT, supra note 66, at
56-111; MURPHY, supra note 66, at 37-90; Epstein & Jacobi, supra note 66; Timothy R. Johnson, James
E Spriggs II & Paul J. Wahlbeck, Passing and Strategic Voting on the U.S. Supreme Court, 39 L. &
Soc. REV. 349 (2005).

68. And yet another problem, which we will ignore as too much of a digression, is that where judges
take account of the votes of other judges, a judge may vote in a way (and exaggerate her confidence) in
order to maximize her influence. We suspect this is unlikely to happen within courts, where judges in
repeat-play relationships develop a reputation with their colleagues, but it could happen across courts.
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normative advice about how to vote so as to promote the overall interests of the
legal system. The relentlessly strategic audience will listen to the advice only
when and insofar as it already dovetails with what they already want to do. At
most, the analyst could offer strategic judges instrumental advice about how to
pursue their ends. 69

A corollary is that strategic behavior by judges or Justices is a more general
problem, hardly unique to this setting. Consider the certiorari process, or the
possibilities for strategic behavior opened up by the Doctrinal Paradox (the
choice between aggregating judicial votes over discrete issues or aggregating
votes over bottom line judgments). 70 The issue of strategic behavior is thus far
more general than our suggestion, and indeed orthogonal to our puzzles, unless
there is some special reason for thinking that strategic behavior is exacerbated
when judges are permitted to consider the votes of other judges. We see no
general reason why that should be so. And, in fact, the evidence of strategic
voting is ambiguous. 1

A major check on strategic voting, here and elsewhere, is reputational. On
multimember courts, judges in a repeat-play relationship with colleagues will
soon discern whether a given judge always happens to discern ambiguity when,
for example, doing so induces deference congenial to the strategic judge.
Outside commentators will follow suit. Insofar as strategic judges are (especially) likely to be concerned with reputation,72 the risk of losing credibility and
of public shaming will act as a countervailing check on exploitation of interdependent voting.
For these reasons, the general risk of strategic voting does not undermine our
argument in the previous Section. Nonetheless, it is certainly important to take
that risk into account during the analysis. In particular, we will highlight one
type of strategic voting that is prominent in the literature on group decision
making. Suppose that judges have common preferences about policy or legal
outcomes (that is, they want to decide the case "correctly"), but have different
amounts of information, experience, etc. Strategic behavior in this context

69. See Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Inside or Outside the System?, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 1743,
1744 (describing an "inside/outside fallacy" that "combin[es] ideal with nonideal theory in an incoherent way, positing nonideal motivations for purposes of diagnosis and then positing idealized motivations for purposes of prescription"); Adrian Vermeule, Self-Defeating Proposals:Ackerman on Emergency
Powers, 75 FORDHAM L. REv. 631, 631 (2006) ("Proposals defeat themselves when the motives, beliefs,
or political opportunities ascribed to relevant actors by the theorist's diagnosis are incompatible with
the solution that the theorist offers.").
70. See Adrian Vermeule, The Supreme Court, 2008 Term-Foreword: System Effects and the
Constitution, 123 HARV. L. REV. 4, 14-15 (2009) (illustrating how "a given profile of judgments will
yield different collective judgments under different aggregation procedures," such as conclusion-based
versus premise-based procedures); see also Lewis A. Kornhauser & Lawrence G. Sager, Unpacking the
Court, 96 YALE L.J. 82, 102-05 (1986); Christian List, Collective Wisdom: Lessons from the Theory of
Judgment Aggregation, in COLLECTIVE WISDOM: PRINCIPLES AND MECHANISMS 203, 204-09 (Helene
Landemore & Jon Elster eds., 2012).
71. See LAWRENCE BAUM, THE PUZZLE OF JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR 121-24 (1997).
72. See generally id.
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means rational epistemic free riding 73-acting in such a way that puts more of
the burden of deciding the case on other, possibly more informed, judges. We
will address this problem at several points in the discussion that follows.
2. Herd Behavior
One might worry that if judges are told to take into account the votes of other
judges, they may use this as an excuse not to think carefully about how the case
should be resolved. The problem is illustrated by well-known herd behavior
models.7 4 In a herd behavior model, a group of people collectively chooses an
outcome through sequential voting. Each agent receives partial information
about the underlying question, modeled as a private signal that gives each agent
a probability less than one of being correct. When an agent decides how to vote,
she observes both her own signal and the pattern of votes that came before. She
bases her vote on the combined information that the signal and the pattern give
her.
Suppose, for example, that the agents must decide a simple question, like
whether the number of balls in an urn exceeds a threshold. Each agent observes
the urn; their varying cognitive abilities give the agents more or less accurate
information about the number of balls. The first agent to vote must rely entirely
on her private signal-that is, her estimate of the number of balls. The second
agent relies in part on her private signal and in part on the first agent's vote. The
third agent relies in part on her private signal and in part on the votes of the first
two agents. And so on.
The problem is that as the votes accumulate, the nth agent has less and less
incentive to rely on her own information. Imagine that the first five agents
announce that the number of balls exceeds the threshold. The sixth agent's
signal is the opposite (having looked carefully at the urn, she believes that the
number of balls falls short of the threshold), but she may disregard it because
the probability that the first five agents are wrong is very small. However,
the probability is not zero. It is possible that they are wrong, and further
possible that if the sixth agent votes sincerely, then subsequent agents will rely
to a greater degree on their private signals because the public information is
now noisier than it had been before. In short, by following the herd, an agent
conceals information from others, which would ideally be revealed to them.
Moreover, the agent may also use less than the optimal amount of effort to form
her opinion.
This phenomenon creates an apparent paradox for our argument. We believe
that judges should take account of the votes of other judges, but if they do, they

73. See Christian List & Philip Pettit, An Epistemic Free-Riding Problem?,in KARL POPPER: CRITICAL

APPRAISALS 128, 138-40 (Philip Catton & Graham Macdonald eds., 2004).
74. See, e.g., Abhijit V. Banerjee, A Simple Model of Herd Behavior, 107 Q.J. ECON. 797 (1992);
Andrew F. Daughety & Jennifer F. Reinganum, Stampede to Judgment: Persuasive Influence and
Herding Behavior by Courts, 1 AM. L. & ECON. REv. 158 (1999).
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may conceal their own information in a way that is ultimately detrimental. This
sort of paradox is well-known in sequential voting situations, both within a
group and across groups over time.75
The paradox, however, is manageable in two ways. First, when a judge's turn
to vote arrives, he should both announce his private judgment (his signal) and
cast his vote. While he may vote with the herd, the disclosure of his signal
ensures that relevant private information will reach subsequent judges, who may
be influenced by it. Second, the paradox arises only with sequential voting. With
one or more rounds of simultaneous voting, judges will fully reveal their own
independent judgment to the group in the first round, and they can then take
account of others' views in subsequent rounds. The paradox, then, points to the
need for careful thought about the structure of voting procedures and rules in
multimember institutions, but it does not by itself vitiate the benefits of taking
others' votes into account. If judges adopt sequential voting, they should also
agree to be candid about their private views; but they might also adopt a
different form of voting that is less vulnerable to herd behavior incentives.
3. The Swing Voter's Curse
We can get another angle on this problem by considering another model,
known as the swing voter's curse. 76 In a model of voting behavior in which
voting is costless and voters are rational and have common preferences but
different levels of information about outcomes, an informed voter will always
vote for the outcome that he prefers (and that, by assumption, he believes is best
for everyone), but a less informed (but not completely uninformed) voter will
abstain rather than vote. The reason is that the uninformed voter knows that if
his view happens to be correct, then he knows that the informed voter will vote
in the same way, and so doesn't need to vote himself-as is true for the other
uninformed voters as well. And if his view happens to be incorrect, then he and
the other uninformed voters may be able to outvote the informed voter but do
not want to. By abstaining, the uninformed voter defers to the wisdom of the
informed voters.
Now imagine three judges who hear a case and hold a vote in conference. A
judge who feels unsure about the proper outcome will rationally abstain from
the conference vote, allowing the other judges to vote. If those judges agree, the
first judge will rationally join them. ("Now that I have given the case some
thought, I find myself in agreement with you.") As in the model, this outcome is

75. See, e.g., ADRIAN VERMEULE, LAW AND THE LIMITS OF REASON 75-77 (2009) (labeling this the
"Burkean paradox" and explaining its application to judicial voting over time); Kai Spiekermann &
Robert E. Goodin, Courts of Many Minds, 42 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 555 (2012) (viewing sequential voting
among courts through the lens of the Condorcet Jury Theorem).
76. Timothy J. Feddersen & Wolfgang Pesendorfer, The Swing Voter's Curse, 86 AM. ECON. REv. 408
(1996). For recent discussion, see CHRISTIAN LIST & PHILIP PETTIT, GROUP AGENCY. THE POSSIBILITY,
DESIGN, AND STATUS OF CORPORATE AGENTS 115-25 (2011).
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optimal in the sense that it produces the highest likelihood of a correct result.77
The swing voter's curse (SVC) model provides grounds for optimism. Indeed, it suggests that judges already take account of the votes of other judges,
and that in doing so, they behave optimally. What explains this difference from
the herd behavior model? The answer lies in a basic difference between the
models: in the SVC model, voting is simultaneous; in the herd behavior model,
voting is sequential. If a voter with limited information happens to go first in the
herd behavior, and must vote yes or no, his vote has outsized influence just
because of its location in the sequence. By contrast, since the uncertain voter in
the SVC model may abstain, he can simply allow the other voters to decide the
issue. However, this difference is not as great as it may seem. If voters in a herd
behavior model are allowed to abstain, then initial voters with limited information will do just that, and-we suspect-the outcome will be similar to that of

the SVC model.
Voting in the SVC model produces optimal outcomes for the voters, but it
may harm others outside the model. Where politicians use voting outcomes to
learn public sentiment, this loss of information is socially costly. In the case of
judicial behavior, if an uncertain judge "abstains" by going along with her
colleagues to produce a unanimous opinion, then judges in future cases will not
know about her uncertainty, which, under some conditions, may be useful
information. At least in theory, the weak views of one or more judges might
collectively outweigh the strong view of another judge. In this sense, the SVC
model, like the herd behavior model, may produce suboptimal outcomes.
The models assume perfect rationality on the part of voters, and this leads to
an assumption that seems to us relatively strong: that when people vote, they
take account not only of their own information and preferences, but they
calculate their probability of being pivotal. 78 Thus, the relevance of the models
to actual voting behavior remains unclear. But two lessons can be drawn from
them. First, it is both rational and socially desirable for judges to give
weight to the votes of other judges; more specifically, an uncertain judge should
defer to the majority of other judges if a majority exists and those judges appear
to have more information. Second, it also remains possible that when a judge
defers in this way, valuable information may be lost. Judges should give weight
to the votes of other judges, but not too much weight.

77. If the first two judges do not agree, the third judge will rationally rely on his own information
and vote accordingly.
78. There is, however, some evidence that people do behave this way. Indeed, the anomaly that
people often show up to a voting booth but abstain from certain issues motivated the original article,
see Feddersen & Pesendorfer, supra note 76, and other work has found evidence in experimental
settings. See, e.g., Berno Buechel & Lydia Mechtenberg, The Swing Voter's Curse in Social Networks
(University of Hamburg, WiSo-HH Working Paper No. 29, 2015) (reporting results and discussing
experimental literature).
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E.

ANALOGIES

We end by mentioning two important debates in legal theory, involving
precedent and foreign law, that have implicitly raised similar issues, usually
without awareness by the participants of the underlying theoretical problems.7 9
The more systematic approach we take here illuminates these debates.
Precedent. By arguing that judges should presumptively take account of the
votes of other judges, aren't we just arguing that judges should pay attention to
precedent? No. Initially, we believe that judges should take account of the votes
of other judges who hear the same case as well as judges who have heard
similar cases at earlier times. However, the main distinction is that stare decisis
refers to the idea that judges should follow earlier cases either as a matter of
authority, because those cases are controlling as a matter of law, or as a matter
of intrinsic quality, because the reasoning in those cases is persuasive. The
specific vote count does not play a role in the conventional understanding of
stare decisis.
Nonetheless, there is an analogy. When judges gauge the strength of a
precedent, they frequently count the number of cases that embrace the precedent
or the number of jurisdictions in which courts have adopted the precedent. The
strength of a persuasive precedent increases with the number of adoptions as
well as the consistency of the views of courts that have considered it. Concerns
that courts follow precedents too readily (rather than give independent thought
to the issue) or depart from precedents too quickly (rather than respect the
wisdom of other courts) mirror the reasons we have given for judges giving
proper weight to the votes of other judges.80 Moreover, consistent with our
argument, judges sometimes gauge the strength of a precedent by reference to
the vote split in precedential opinions.8 1

79. A third example, which came to our attention during the publication process, is also highly
pertinent. When courts review pain and suffering and punitive damage awards, they struggle with the
huge variation in the amounts awarded by juries. This has given rise to a proposal that courts use
"comparable-case guidance," meaning that they inform the juries of awards in similar cases or use those
awards themselves when reviewing jury awards. As Hillel Bavli shows in an important paper,
comparable-case guidance can be given a firm statistical foundation. See Bavli, supra note 53. In the
context of our argument, prior awards in comparable cases can be seen as analogous to votes, which
courts should then use to inform their decision in the case at hand.
80. For a paper exploring precedent from a perspective similar to ours, see Scott Baker & Anup
Malani, Judicial Learning and the Quality of Legal Rules (Jan. 22, 2013) (unpublished manuscript) (on
file with author). Baker and Malani use a herd behavior model to show that judges will rationally
"hide" decisions by not publishing them or by issuing an order without an explanation when their
private signal about the quality of the information is noisy. The judge hides decisions in order to
prevent future judges from overweighting them. This is akin to abstaining rather than voting in our
discussion. Baker and Malani also discuss how herding can lead to both overweighting and underweighting of prior decisions.
81. See, e.g., Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 828-29 (1991) (suggesting that Supreme Court
precedents "decided by the narrowest of margins, over spirited dissents" have reduced stare decisis
effect).
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That said, stare decisis also supports values that are independent of the
information and accuracy concerns that motivate our analysis of vote counting.
Among other things, respect for precedent advances consistency across jurisdictions and across time. Vote-counting advances these goals only indirectly.
Foreign law. The debate about whether courts should consider "foreign law"
also has some connections with our argument. Several Supreme Court justices,
including Justices Breyer and Kennedy, have argued that the Supreme Court
should take account of the laws, judicial opinions, and other legal materials of
other countries when deciding certain constitutional questions.8 2 They argue, for
example, that in determining whether a punishment is "cruel and unusual"
under the Eighth Amendment, American judges should take into account whether
other countries permit or forbid that punishment.8 3 Other justices argue that
foreign law is irrelevant to the resolution 5of disputes under American constitu8
tional law.8 4 Commentators are also split.
While the argument has been couched in terms of American exceptionalism,
theories of constitutional interpretation, and other highfalutin categories, it can
be understood most easily as a debate about whether foreign law provides
useful information or not.8 6 Indeed, the relevant information might be used
either by courts or by other governmental institutions. Consider, for example,
the possibility that use of the death penalty turns, or should turn, simply on
whether it has substantial deterrence effect. If one believes that other countries

care about deterrence, and if most other countries have abolished the death
penalty,8 7 the "votes" of these other countries are suggestive that the death
penalty does not deter. Of course, all of these premises can be contested, and the

82. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 572-73, 576-77 (2003) (Kennedy, J., citing
European law condemning the punishment of homosexual behavior). See generally STEPHEN BREYER,
THE COURT AND THE WORLD: AMERICAN LAW AND THE NEW GLOBAL REALITIES (2015).
83. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 575 (2005) ("Our determination that the death penalty is
disproportionate punishment for offenders under 18 finds confirmation in the stark reality that the
United States is the only country in the world that continues to give official sanction to the juvenile
death penalty.... [T]he Court has referred to the laws of other countries and to international authorities
as instructive for its interpretation of the Eighth Amendment's prohibition of 'cruel and unusual
punishments."').
84. See, e.g., id. at 622-28 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (objecting to the Court's use of foreign law to help
interpret the Eighth Amendment). See generally Norman Dorsen, The Relevance of Foreign Legal
Materials in U.S. Constitutional Cases: A Conversation Between Justice Antonin Scalia and Justice
Stephen Breyer, 3 INT'L J. CONST. L. 519 (2005).
85. Compare Mark Tushnet, The Possibilities of Comparative ConstitutionalLaw, 108 YALE L.J.
1225 (1999) (arguing that foreign constitutional experience can inform the interpretation of the U.S.
Constitution), with Roger P Alford, In Search ofA Theoryfor ConstitutionalComparativism, 52 UCLA
L. REv. 639, 712 (2005) (arguing that "the use of contemporary foreign and international laws and
practices to interpret constitutional guarantees is ill-suited under most modern constitutional theories").
86. See Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, The Law of Other States, 59 STAN. L. REv. 131 (2006).
87. This is not, in fact, the case. According to Amnesty International, as of the end of 2014, 98
countries in the world had abolished the death penalty for all crimes, out of a total of 198 countries
(although the number is higher in practice-35 additional countries retain the death penalty but are
"abolitionist in practice"). AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, DEATH SENTENCES AND EXECUTIONS 2014, 34, 64
(2015), https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/pollO/0001/2015/en/ [https://perma.cc/4LG5-K34Q].
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value of accounting for the foreign law of other countries will depend on
numerous factors-including the similarity of those countries to ours.88 But the
informational value of the practices of foreign countries is hard to deny, and it
seems unlikely that completely ignoring such practices is the optimal solution.
Indeed, as the policy diffusion literature has documented, the governments of
countries frequently copy successful policies of other countries, as do the
governments of American states.89 Governments treat adoptions of policies in
other countries as "votes" for those policies, and they take account of those
votes. Perhaps courts should as well. It is, of course, a separate question
whether the constitutional and legal theories courts use allow consideration of
such matters at all, whether the relevant information stems from domestic or
foreign sources; our narrow point is that if, and to the extent that, the best theory
does allow that, then it is implausible to exclude all foreign sources from an
informational point of view.
CONCLUSION

We have argued that as a presumptive matter, judges should take into account
the votes of colleagues. Within a court, judges should consider using a twostage voting procedure: in the first stage, each judge votes; in the second stage,
the judges may change their votes in light of what they learned from the first
stage. Across courts, judges should use voting patterns in related cases to help
them decide the cases before them. In some circumstances, the systemic costs of
considering the votes of other judges will outweigh the benefits, and we have
indicated conditions under which that will be so. But there is no warrant for a
general prohibition on the practice. 90
Happily, the law has no such general prohibition. Judges do sometimes take
the votes of other judges into account, both as to simple first-order questions,
and as to complex questions, where judges sometimes use the very fact of
disagreement as evidence of whether the legal test is satisfied-qualified immunity being the clearest example. Unhappily, however, law has no general,
well-considered account of the whole set of issues; judges fuddle along area-byarea, behaving more or less inconsistently. There is no obvious systemic reason
why, for example, the votes of other judges should be taken into account for
purposes of qualified immunity, but not for purposes of the rule of lenity or
Chevron.
Although the law is inconsistent, our proposal has the virtue of being patently
compatible with what judges already do-sometimes haphazardly and in an

88. For further discussion, see Posner & Sunstein, supra note 86.
89. See generally KATERINA LINOS, THE DEMOCRATIC FOUNDATIONS OF POLICY DIFFUSION: How HEALTH,
FAMILY AND EMPLOYMENT LAWS SPREAD ACROSS COUNTRIES (2013).
90. We have not addressed the risk of strategic behavior by litigants (as opposed to judges), who
might rush to the courthouse in order to obtain a favorable outcome from judges likely to favor them in
order to start a cascade. If this is really a risk, then judges will need to take this into account.

190

THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 105:159

untheoretical way. It is not as though we are asking them to read Kant or to
study nuclear engineering. What we suggest is that judges pause to consider
when and why it makes sense to consider their colleagues' votes, as opposed to
indulging themselves in solipsistic decision making. If judges consider that, we
hope and trust they will conclude that their colleagues-presumptively reasonable others, much like themselves-have valuable information to offer.

